The Pribilof program was in trouble. The seal decline had reached crisis proportions - from an estimated two million animals in 1870 to only about 133,000 in 1910.1 The program faced other threats to its stability in the 1910s such as continued revenue losses and a national scandal. Organizational survival preoccupied management and shaped its policies in this decade.
The crisis in seals could not be blamed on the private lease system but it came to be associated with it, especially in the face of mounting charges that the North American Commercial Company was engaging in illegal pelagic sealing - accusations soon confirmed by a Congressional investigation. 2 More important in discrediting the private lease system, however, was the emergence of a conservation lobby in the United States, activated by Theodore Roosevelt's succession to the Presidency in 1901. Before that, people had thought of natural resources primarily as a source for industrial exploitation. Roosevelt, however, popularized a conservation concept that stimulated the organization of national conservation groups, such as the Campfire Club of America. The Senate established a committee on conservation. And, in 1909, President Taft appointed a fur seal advisory board composed of prominent biologists, all but one of whom had visited the Pribilofs. 3 These groups clamored for an end to the private lease system and a mora,torium on sealing in the Pribilofs to give the herd a chance to recover.
Congress responded to these pressures with the 1910 Fur Seal Act.4 The Act ended the private lease system and assigned sole responsibility for the Pribilof program to the Department of Commerce and Labor. The Department and its Bureau of Fisheries were responsible not only for regulating the harvests and protecting the herd, but for harvesting and marketing the skins. Like its predecessor, the Act provided for the welfare of Aleuts. But additionally it required the Department to pay Aleut sealers fair com- pensation for their labor, though it offered no standards for determining what constituted fair compensation.
The Act, of course, did not resolve the seal crisis. That resolution depended on intemational negotiations; fortunately, these were nearing fruition. In 1911, the United States, Great Britain (representing Canada), Japan, and Russia signed a treaty - the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention - abolishing sealing on the high seas for fifteen years.5 (The ban is still in effect; it was interrupted only once by Japan during World War II.) Japan and Russia were included in the treaty because the Japanese hunted seals that bred at the Russian-owned Commander Islands. In exchange for abstain- ing from pelagic sealing, Japan and Canada each were to receive 15 percent of the Russian and 15 percent of the United States' fur seal harvests.
Yes, two decades of struggle were at an end; the seal controversy was resolved. But the resolution created an additional strain for management, for now the program had to produce revenues to meet international obligations. Restoration of the herd became urgent. On the advice of Bureau of Fisheries biologists, Congress in 1912 declared a five-year moratorium on sealing in the Pribilofs, except for seals needed for the Aleuts' food.6
This respite gave the Bureau time to organize the seal business within the United States. In 1913 and 1914, probably because of the war in Eur- ope, the Bureau sold the skins at auction in the United States. In 1915 it ne- gotiated a contract with a St. Louis firm, Funsten and Brothers, to process and market the skins. Six years later, it signed a new contract with Funsten's successor, Fouke Fur Company (Fouke had been president of Funsten's),7 which, aside from periodic supplements and one short interruption, is still in effect.
During the moratorium, revenues from the seal industry were very small; in the eight years 1911 to 1919, the government experienced a net loss of $755,947 in the Pribilof program.8 If cost considerations were important in the past, they were paramount now.
The Congressional relief appropriation, which constituted the major, portion of the Aleuts' livelihood, was no longer referred to as relief but as a wage supplement, undoubtedly because of the "fair compensation" clause in the 1910 Act. Pribilof management took pains to convey this change in concept to agents.
1911 Instructions to AgentsIn line with this concept, management instructed agents to distribute the appropriation to the extent possible in the form of a wage payment rather than a gratuity. All of it was paid in supplies at the government store and in coal issues. This is how the system worked: each sealer received credit at the govemment store in varying amounts depending on work classifications; for example, the most skilled worker received an allowance of $5.00 a week, and the least skilled, $2.50. [The practice of paying wages in the form of store credit was not unique to the Pribilofs; it was also common practice in the fur trapping trade, especially when Indians were involved. ]The rest of the appropriation was distributed as relief with fixed amounts assigned to widows, children, teenagers, and elderly. 10
It is the purpose of this bureau not only to secure the comfort and maintenance of these people as required by law, but also, while doing so better their social and moral condition, by doing away with gratuities and furnishing them with the necessaries of life only as a return for labor performed.9
The Aleuts received no cash payments at all except negligible amounts for occasional labor for the naval radio station on St. Paul. At the outset of the new period, management directed agents to pay Aleuts in cash for labor on government property, but it soon eliminated funds for this purpose.11
In 1913 Congress increased the Aleuts' appropriation to $35,000; and in 1915, to $40,000.12 When the appropriation is calculated as income along with services provided by the Bureau, such as free medical care and rent-free housing, and the small amount earned at miscellaneous labor, Aleuts' income matched that of other male production workers.13 Yet, agents consistently complained about the Aleuts' poverty. Lembkey likened the Aleut's standard of living to that "of unskilled laborers of the poorer classes.''14 Agent Fassett who succeeded Lembkey also decried the low living standards: "Their children, in particular, are insufficiently nourished and clothed, and practically all the people are inadequately housed in old, dilapidated buildings now on the verge of collapse . . . and the allowance of fuel, which should have been more, has just been cut in half." 15 Physicians added their voices to the protest, especially when it came to milk for the children which was often unavailable.16
Yes, agents objected to the Aleuts' poverty. But more clamant was their outcry against the persistence of payments in kind. Lembkey railed against this injustice, claiming that it destroyed the Aleuts' incentives. In an effort to influence management, he tried a cash experiment in St. George for one year.
In 1911 a plan was put in operation designed to induce the natives to save at least a small portion of their earnings. It was based upon the general principle that by reducing weekly and other issues of supplies to a minimum an unexpended balance would be created, which balance at the year's end was to be distributed in cash among the earners... If even from a weekly allowance the natives saved something, that saving was to be given him in cash at once. It was hoped he could be induced to open savings accounts with cash thus obtained, or at least to use it in purchasing some articles not othenvise obtainable that would increase his happiness and comfort . . .Though Lembkey designed the experiment to induce Aleuts to save money, he quickly learned that savings had no meaning when there was nothing to purchase with them: "The reward of self-denial exists in the possibilities for greater enjoyment and comfort created as the result of self discipline. If the native has no use for this money, he will not save it; neither will anyone.''18 Lembkey concluded his report on the experiment with an impassioned plea to pay the Aleuts' wages in cash. 19
The results from a careful following of the plan are interesting. At the end of the first month in which the native men were informed that such savings as they made from their weekly allowances for family supplies would be paid in cash more than half the families in the village drew cash savings thus derived . . . They continued to do this during each remaining month of the year, almost every family saving some- thing of the amount allowed for its support.
Careful inquiries into the motives governing the making of these savings developed some interesting points. It seemed . . . that the main object of the native was not to hoard the cash thus obtained by saving but . . . to get possession of the cash itself, which in many instances he at once took to the store to expend for perhaps the very articles he had denied himself in order to make the saving. Some few, of course, used the cash to purchase in San Francisco articles which could not have been issued to them had they not the cash. No savings accounts were created. . .
It is reported that the natives were greatly pleased with the plan as operated. . .
The net result of this one year experiment is not large. It shows that the natives desire their earnings in cash. . . It shows also that if paid in cash for their labor in taking seal skins, etc., the greater portion . . . would be used for the same purposes for which the credit is used, namely, the purchase of the necessaries of life.'17
With similar zeal, Agent Fassett lambasted the Bureau for paying the Aleuts in supplies.
Although they themselves do not fully appreciate it, the fact cannot be denied that the people of St. Paul (and St. George as well) are living in actual slavery and that this condition exists and is maintained under the immediate control and direction of the United States government.In much less sophisticated and vehement language, in the deferential tone often characteristic of subject people, the Aleuts also asked for some cash wages: "We feed foxes seven months and trap two months. We are willing to do the work but think we should get some cash. . . Respectfully ask that this petition be sent to the Commissioner. " 21
Since 1911 heads of families have received one dollar in cash per year and their quota of the smallest and most restrictive stock of supplies furnished in many years.20
This modest demand and the more insistent ones by agents failed to move Washington officials - hardly surprising when it came to ignoring the Aleuts; that was customary. And such a lack of response was becoming in- creasingly customary in relation to agents. But why? Bureaucracies charac- teristically weigh and balance the demands of the interest groups that surround them. Agents' demands could hardly compete with those of Congress. The program had always faced Congressional expectations not only to be self-supporting, but to produce a revenue surplus. In this period, keenly aware of international obligations at a time of revenue losses, Congress had also posed a cost-cutting expectation. One way Congress expressed this expectation was to cut agents' salaries nearly in half and to reduce the administrative budget to the bone.22 The Deputy Commissioner of Fisheries in 1914 considered the Pribilof budget "wholly inadequate to manage the business in an effic~ent manner."23 Managers probably refused to consider restoring the Aleuts' cash wages because in those lean years they found it easier to manipulate supplies (for example reducing the coal allowance) than cash wages. Perhaps, too, sensitive to the "fair compensation" clause, they considered it less visibly a violation of fair compensation to reduce the amount of supplies than to lower cash wages.
With all the instability of this period, the Bureau of Fisheries also faced a national scandal. Since the beginning of sole federal jurisdiction, the record increasingly reveals instances of federal employee drunkenness and sexual abuse of Aleut women. In 1911 the St. George physician confessed to seduction of two girls who had come to his office for professional services. One of the girls became pregnant as a result and died in childbirth. The agent was irate.
At 2 p.m., word was brought by that the Orloff infant had died and at 7 this evening Nadessa died having been unconscious about 36 hours.Lembkey must have summarily dismissed Morgan, for [Morgan left St. George immediately after Lembkey arrived. Soon after that, Dr. McGovern became implicated in similar situations. "The entire cause of Dr. McGovern's demoralization and neglect of duty were his uncontrollable desire for and continuous indulgence in alcoholic liquors and his relations with some of the natives on the islands." wrote the agent when asking for the doctor's removal.25 In 1914, a full-blown scandal involving five government employees on the islands erupted. It was fropt page news in the New York Times.
Nadessa was a beautiful girl, 19 years old, well behaved, modest and ladylike in every respect. Her downfall and subsequent death may be placed at the door of Dr. Morgan who was resident physician on this island. Nadessa concealed the fact of her condition until very recently when, under the seal of professional secrecy, she admitted to Dr. McGovern (St. Paul physician) that she was pregnant and stated to him that Dr. Morgan was responsible. Morgan himself informed Mr. Box last sum- mer that he had sexual intercourse with both of the priest's daughters during the preceding winter, and in effect, he told Mr. Proctor the same thing. . . I will take this matter up with Mr. Lembkey on his arrival in June and see if something can be done toward bringing this brute of a Morgan to punishment.24
Five American government agents were under arrest at their stations on the Pribilof Islands, better known as the Fur Seal Islands, in the Bering Sea, on charges of a serious nature affecting their conduct and treatment of the natives, men and women.Those under accusation were P.R. Hatton, St. Paul agent; L.N. Tongue, St. Paul storekeeper; Dr. C.J. McGovern, St. Paul physician; AH. Proctor, St. George agent; and P.L. McLenny, Navy wireless operator.
Among the charges that have been lodged against the principal government agents on the Pribilof Islands are debauching the wives of natives, terrorizing their husbands into silence, drunkenness and furnishing intoxicants to the natives, creating a condition in the community that has resulted in death and lawlessness. . .
Pending the investigation, the inhabitants of the islands are being guarded by the vessels of the Bureau of Fisheries, the revenue cutter service, and the navy.
The charges first reached Washington on June 30 in a communication to Secretary Redfield from Mr. and Mrs. Alvin D. Whitney, teachers on St. Paul Island. Mr. Redfield at once ordered Dr. Jones (Deputy Commissioner of Fisheries) to make the investigation... The Whitneys have submitted to Secretary Redfield a diary running from July, 1913 to May, 1914 reciting almost daily allegations of scandal- ous conduct on the part of officials. Reporting from St. George's Island, G Dallas Hanna, a school teacher, said: "Morality among the natives is almost unknown." He added that conditions had grown worse since the government took over the fur seal fisheries in 1910.26
In making the investigation, Jones was appalled at the condition he found.
It (the investigation) showed beyond a question of doubt that a deplorable condb tion has existed on these islands for years, and resulted in the dismissal from the service of both men on St. Paul Island. All government officials who have allowed the morals of the islands to be disturbed have violated their oath of office and are guilty of gross misconduct if not of criminal negligence.27Information on the outcome of the charges against the five men is incomplete. The personnel record of the Navy employee could not be located. Dr. McGovem resigned his position before the arrests were made and his personnel file included no mention of the incident. The agent and the storekeeper at St. Paul were summarily fired from their jobs prior to their trial by the United States Department of Justice.28 And the St. George agent must have been exonerated of all charges for he remained on his job and later became the first superintendent of the Pribilofs, a position that was established when the Bureau opened a Seattle office in 1920. His personnel file also contained no reference to the incident.
Sweeping out the malefactors was only part of the staff housecleaning on the Pribilofs. A new Bureau of Fisheries chief was appointed in 1914; shortly afterwards, except for Agent Proctor on St. George, there was a complete staff turnover including Lembkey. (We were unable to discover why, after ten years on the islands, Lembkey left; the Department of Labor could not locate his personnel file.) Why the turnover? - it appears to reflect the caretaking nature of management during this period and, therefore, the need for a different type of agent. Since there were no commercial harvests, agents' responsibilities were significantly reduced. The Congressional reduction in agents' salaries, from $3,650 in 1911 to $2,000 in 1913 was one reflection of this decrease in responsibilities.29 Another was a change in agents' title from agent in charge to agent and caretaker. Furthermore, the Bureau hired less-qualified agents. Lembkey and the assistant agent on St. Paul had doctorates; none hired subsequently had this level of training. As caretakers, agents exercised far less authority than in the past; in fact, management eliminated agents' influence on policy by instructing them to keep their opinions to themselves.
An examination of the recent report by Mr. Henry W. Elliot of his visit to the Seal Islands in the summer of 1913 shows a number of extracts from the island logs. It is observed that the agents . . . making entries into the logs have not confined them- selves to statements of facts. They have apparently felt free to incorporate into the logs personal opinions and comments. Matters of these kinds have no legitimate place in the official log.Agents must have received similar instructions regarding annual reports, for these became increasingly routine, divested of the rich comments and descriptions in earlier reports and confined to such pedestrian matters as records of harvests and payments to Aleut sealers.
You are directed hereafter to record in the log all important facts as to the daily occurrences on the islands, omitting expressions of opinion and personal comments. 30
This change in agents' role may have sprung from an additional source. Now that the federal government was solely responsible and accountable for the Pribilof program, managers wanted tighter control over agents; they wanted, not agent independence as in the past, but agent loyalty, reliability of response, and obedience to rules and regulations issued from above. Whatever motivated these changes, the upshot was to silence agents and divest them of most of their power.
While this was a dark period in the Pribilof history, the Bureau of Fisheries adopted what appeared to be an enlightened policy toward higher education of Aleuts. Until 1910, the private lessees had provided education only through the fourth or fifth grade. But when the government became fully responsible for the program, management suggested training "a number of the brighter girls and boys to do a part of the clerical work incident to the administration of the service,''31 (training that would entail attendance at high schools outside the Pribilofs). What accounts for this change? Did the assumption of greater responsibility spark managers' consciences? Did it make them more sensitive to demands of the Indian rights movement which crusaded for education as the chief means for assimilating Indians? Perhaps, but there appears to be a more clamant motivation - to train Aleuts for middle-level jobs in these cost-cutting years. The hiring of Aleut clerks, bookkeepers, and storekeepers could effect a considerable savings in labor costs since the Bureau had to provide transportation and room and board for imported employees.
The Bureau faced an immediate obstacle in implementing the new policy - the Aleuts had not yet mastered the English language. The agent in 1910 asserted that only a few Aleuts had an adequate grasp of English.32 Members of a special govemment investigating committee in 1913 came to a similar conclusion: "About half the population can answer simple English questions, and five or six speak English well."33 Agents and teachers blamed this learning failure on the persistence of the Russian school, the priest's refusal to conduct the church service in English, and parents' insistence on speaking Aieut in the home. Lembkey advanced a different hypothesis; he attributed the failure to the low caliber of the schools.
The teachers supplied by those companies were usually, if not always, selected with reference to their ability to perform clerical or other duties rather than for their fitness as teachers. The companies seemed to regard the schools as a matter of secondary importance and required the teachers to devote most of their time to work bearing no relation to the education of native children. As a result, with a few notable exceptions, the persons who performed the duties of teacher had no special fitness or training for those duties. . . It is not surprising, therefore, that no rational system of education has been worked out to meet the needs of those people and that so little progress has been made.34In response to Lembkey's explanation, the Bureau immediately hired trained teachers. But still its major thrust was to suppress the Aleut language Managers directed teachers to forbid the use of the Aleut tongue in the school and playground. They prohibited the Russian school, which was again operating, from holding classes during the eight-month American school session. They banned the use of interpreters. And they instructed agents "in all the relations of the Government with the natives and the natives with the Government, only the English language shall be employed, and you will discourage in every possible way the use of any other language."35 Agents forbade the use of the Aleut language in public recreation places and enjoined the priests to conduct at least part of the church service in English.
Undoubtedly, the Bureau justified these suppressions in humanitarian terms. Education was a privilege, and the Bureau was providing the Aleuts opportunities for growth and development. But, as Michael Katz stoutly asserts in his study of nineteenth century school reform:
We have still to see a movement driven by a desire to bring joy and delight to the life of the individual, to enrich experience solely for the purpose of making life more full and lovely. The goals...quite the contrary, have been extrinsic; they have stressed the needs of society and the economy.36Katz argues that educational reform was imposed on an unwilling working class in the name of humanitarian ideals by middle-class persons concerned about political and economic imperatives. Furthermore, he points out that despite educational reformers' rhetoric about cultural relativity, a mentality of cultural absolutism dominated the schools and thereby alienated working class populations.
And so in the Pribilofs, Aleuts were alienated by the cultural suppressions that were embedded in their education. Yes, some probably aspired to high school training, but as an option rather than a substitute for their cultural institutions. They were intent on guarding and nourishing what little remained of their culture. Listen to this moving defense of their cultural institutions that were under attack.
We gathered and talked and they all agreed and writing to Washington, D.C" this is what we are asking for. . .In characteristic fashion, the Commissioner stubbornly rejected the Aleuts' appeal: "The Bureau can make no modification in its present rule in regard to the use of the native language . . . (and) the Bureau cannot consent to the reestablishment of the independent native school. " 38
Second in this business we are told not to talk in our own language, and not to have our own interpreter . . . and, in this case, our agent want us to talk just one language, and it is pretty hard from them older men, and for this case we want the interpreter, and the community chief, besides the government foreman like we used to have before so as to know what they are talking about and tell what they are saying. . .
Fifth, we are keeping our religion in good order. and think it's higher above all things and we want our children to be good, for that case we are asking you for our school (the Russian school) to be here, open four times a week, from 4:00 o'clock P.M. to 6:00 o'clock PM. and also on Saturdays, and we know the public school up here is pretty good and our children are getting along very good in English language and we want those other school hours to be going on after the chhdren goes out from the public school to their home.37
Suppression of the native language was one facet of the campaign to educate Aleuts, another was attendance at the Chemawa Indian school in Salem, Oregon. One might pause for a moment and think, wait a minute, this was a belt-tightening, cost-conscious period─why was the Bureau assum- ing additional expenses to educate Aleuts? Would the return from their clerical semices adequately compensate for the expenditures? There was virtually no expense involved in the education venture. The Bureau of Fisheries provided transportation on its vessels which sailed whether or not they transported students. And the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Department of Interior covered the boarding and tuition costs. So, beginning in 1911, Pribilof students (mostly from St. Paul since vessels called so infrequently at St. George) began to attend high school in Oregon.
The education plan, however, backfired. While it provided the antici- pated training, it also threatened to reduce the size of the sealing labor force because some Chemawa students did not want to return to the islands. The Bureau expected high school training to produce a pool of potential clerical workers from which it could draw several employees, with the rest returning to sealing work. When students refused to return home or developed ambitions that might produce dissatisfaction with sealing work, officials and agents expressed apprehension. Apparently in an effort to discover conditions that would justify tertninating the high school program, the Commissioner of Fisheries in 1919 directed St. George agent Crompton to investigate the Chemawa school. Crompton gave the school a clean bill of health.
During the day all of the Pribilof boys were separately questioned regarding their comforts and treatment. They were informed that my visit was for the purpose of hearing their grievances if they had any, but they were unanimous in their praise of their treatment and in addition seemed to have a strong "school spirit" of pride in the institution. . . Though I observed closely, nothing seems to indicate that the children were not well cared for in all respects. The food was inspected and the dormitories seen, and all was on an equal with conditions found in the f~rst class boarding schools.39Nonetheless, Crompton strongly recommended discontinuing the Chemawa program in the Pribilofs.
The question of sending Pribilof Island native children to Chemawa, then, becomes one of policy rather than of doubt regarding the care they might receive while there. It is the writer's opinion that it is not in the interests of the United States to send the children to outside schools and I doubt that it adds to the ultimate happi- ness of the individuals.The superintendent of the Pribilofs agreed with the agent's recommendation but for a different reason.
Boys who have attended the school at Chemawa return to the islands in a dissatisfied frame of mind. They have had just sufficient education to see the contrast between a life on the Islands and one in the states and not enough education or experience to see clearly the reasons for the difference. For example, one boy .. . who has spent nearly six years at the school informed me that after he had finished high school (in approximately two more years), it was his intention to go to work and buy his parents a home in Oregon. While this is a praiseworthy ambition, it is quite apparent that unless he is a very unusual boy, it will never materialize. . . He added that he would like to return to St. George Island if he were given a "posi- tion" with the Bureau. While the agents always desire to encourage the brighter boys by giving them work which calls for intelligence, it is evident that the latter ambition of this boy will not be realized under the present system of payments. In short, after seeing the environment of Americans of moderate or ample means in a country and climate much more pleasant than the Pribilof Islands, they return with an unexpressed feeling of discontent with the Island conditions. . .
It is recommended that no more children be sent to the Chemawa school at the instigation of the Bureau.40
The advisability of sending children from these islands to the Chemawa school has been for some time a matter of doubt with me and for that reason I have ceased in my efforts to interest the children. The chief objection is the short time which most of them are willing to remain at this school coupled with the fact that it has gener. ally been the custom to send only those of the best intelligence, some few of whom haue elected to remain away permanently, and to this extent the government's incerests on the Islands, as well as the best interest of the remaining population, have suffered.41The Commissioner of Fisheries finally resolved the issue with a new policy terminating the Chemawa school program in the Pribilofs.
After careful consideration of your report and recommendations, you are informed that until otherwise advised, the policy of the Bureau will be to send no more native children to the Chemawa school unless speciRc request to do so is made by the parents or guardian. It is realized that occasionally natives may desire to go to Chemawa, but it does not seem the course of wisdom for the Bureau to urge or instigate such attendance.42Of course, if the Bureau didn't approve these occasional applications there was no way the Aleuts could attend; they had no funds for transportation. Even this occasional option was denied them several years later by a stipula- tion in the Office of Indian Affairs' budget prohibiting the use of its funds for the support or education of any Alaska native pupil except upon the individual ordertof the Secretary of the Interior.43 And thus ended the brief experiment in high school education for the Aleuts.
Curiously, those who had graduated from Chemawa were not hired ror Bureau positions when they returned to the islands. One wonders why, when the purpose of the plan was to train Aleuts for middle-level jobs. Crompton suggested an answer when he acknowledged the incompatibility between holding a Bureau position and the system of payment in kind. The hiring of Aleut employees would have called that system into question. Would Aleuts employed in Bureau jobs be paid in supplies? That would have been difficult to justify. But if they were paid in cash like other federal employees, it would have introduced a double standard in the family and community. For example, how would the agent have determined the allowance for an Aleut family? Yes, the Bureau undoubtedly had second thoughts about the wisdom of training and hiring Aleuts when it might threaten the foundation of labor-management relations on the islands. In sum, serious threats to the Pribilof program in this first decade of sole federal jurisdiction riveted management's attention to survival needs, and Congressional pressure and budgetary constraints focused management's eye on cost considerations. These were the pressures shaping policy and practices. But by 1918 the seal herd was in healthy condition and commercial sealing was about to resume, promising a return to the halcyon days of revenue surplus. Would these new conditions prompt management to restore agents' former powers or liberalize its labor policies? Would management reinstate cash wages to Aleuts? Would it provide them the same economic benefits that became available to other American workers? How would the situation of the Aleuts in 1935 compare to that of their parents of 1915?
1. U.S. Congress, House, The Fur Seal Industry of Alaska. H. Rpt. No. 1425, 62nd Cong., 3rd sees., 1913, p.2; National Resource Committee, Regional Planning, Part VII, Alaska, Its Resources and Development. No. I. Report of the Alaska Resources Committee (Washington, D.C.: Government Print- ing Office, 1937), p. 66.
2. The Fur Seal Industry of Alaska, H. Rpt. No. 1425, pp. 2-3.
3. Members of the advisory board were: Dr. David Starr Jordan, president of Standford University; Dr. Leonard Stejneger, head curator of biology, United States National Museum; Dr. C. Hart Merriam, chief of the Biological Survey; Dr. Frederick A. Lucas, Director of the American Museum of Natural History; Dr. Charles H. Townsend, director of the New York Aquar- ium; Mr. Edwin W. Sims, former solicitor for the Department of Commerce and Labor; and Mr. Frank H. Hitchcock, Postmaster General and formerly chief clerk of the Department of Commerce and Labor. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Department of Commerce and Labor, House of Representatives, on House Resolution No. 73 to Investigate the Fur Seal Industry of Alaska No. I, 62nd Cong., 1st sees., 1911, p. 109; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Conservation of Natural Resources on Bill S. 7242 entitled "An Act to Protect the Seal Fisheies of Alaska and for Other Purposes," S. Doc. 605, 61st Cong., 2nd sees., 1910, pp. 25-27.
4. Public Law 146 (April 21, 1910).
5. Only Indians of the Northwest Coast were allowed to continue pelagic sealing provided they used no firearms.
6. 37 Stat 499 (August 24, 1912).
7. For the contract and supplements, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Fur Skin Sales, S. Doc. 213, 67th Cong., 2nd sees., 1922, pp. 31-43.
8. George Rogers, An Economic Analysis of the Pribilof Islands,.1870-1946. Prepared for Indian Claims Commission Docket Nos. 352 and 369 (Fairbanks: University of Alaska, Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research, 1976), p. 124.
9. U.S. Congress, House, Appendix A to Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Department of Commerce and Labor, House of Representatives, on House Resolution No. 73 to Investigate the Fur Seal Industry of Alaska, 62nd Cong., 1st sees., 1911, p. 1187.
10. The 1915 schedule was as follows:
Seal clubber = $ 5.00
Seal skinner, first class = 5.00
Seal skinner, second class = 4.50
Mechanic, first class = 4.50
Mechanic, second class = 4.00
Laborer, first class = 3.50
Laborer, second class = 3.00
Laborer, third class = 2.50
Boy, first class = 1.00
Boy, second class = .75
Boy, third class = .50
[Widows as heads of families $3.50 a week. Other adults 16 years of age and over, if male, and 18 years if female, are allowed $1.00 each for their support. All others irrespective of age and sex received $.50.]
H.C. Fassett, Agent and Caretaker, to Commissioner of Fisheries, January 30, 1915, Bureau of Fisheries Records, St. Paul Island.
11. H.C. Fassett, to Commissioner of Fisheries, February 10, 1915, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
12. 38 Stat. 475 (August 12, 1912); 38 Stat. 664 (August 1, 1914). 13. Rogers, An Economic Analysis, p. 159.
14. Memorandum re Remuneration of Natives on St. Paul Island, March 10, 1915, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
15. H.C. Fassett to Commissioner of Fisheries', October 20, 1916, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
16. W. Byrd Hunt to St. Paul agent, August 16, 1916, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
17. Wilfred E. Osgood, et al., The Fur Seal and Other Life of the Pribilof Islands, Alaska in 1914, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915), pp. 136-137. Also issued as U.S. Congress, S. Doc. 980, 63rd Cong., 3rd sees.; and Bureau of Fisheries Doc. No. 820, 1915.
18. Ibid., p. 137.
19. Ibid., pp. 137-138.
20. H.C. Fassett to Commissioner of Fisheries, October 20, 1916, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
21. A.H. Proctor to Commissioner of Fisheries, September 28, 1913, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
22. 36 Stat. 1441 (March 4, 1911).
23. Osgood, The Fur Seal and Other Life, p. 141.
24. Pribilof Islands Daily Log, St. Paul, December 16, 1911.
25. P.R. Hatton, Agent and Caretaker, to Commissioner of Fisheries, June 23, 1914, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
26. New York Times, July 20, 1914, p. 1.
27. E. Lester Jones. Report of Alaska Investigations in 1914 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915), p. 126.
28. Secretary of Commerce and Labor to Honorable Blair Lee, U.S. Senate, July 29,1914, in personnel file of L.M. Tongue.
29.36 Stat. 1441 (Nlarch 4, 1911).
30. H.W. Smith, Commissioner of Fisheries, to Phillip R. Hatton, St. Paul Agent and Caretaker, November 10, 1913, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
31. Appendix A to Hearings, 1911, p. 1195.
32. Ibid., p. 983.
33. Osgood, The Fur Seals and Other Life, 146.
34. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Fisheries, Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1912, Doc. No. 780, 1913, p. 78.
35. Commissioner of Fisheries to H.C. Fassett, August 8, 1914, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
36. Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 214.
37. St. Paul Community to Commissioner of Fisheries, October 10, 1916, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
38. Notice to Natives, July 17, 1917, signed by H.C. Fassett, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
39. C.E. Crompton, St. George Agent and Caretaker, to Commissioner of Fisheries, January 19, 1920, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
41. A.H. Proctor, Superintendent, to C.E. Crompton, St. George Island, September 2, 1920~ Bureau Records, St. Paul.
42. Commissioner HM. Smith to C.E. Crompton, St. George Island, January 20, 1921, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
43. Hubert Work. Superintendent, Chemawa Indian Training School, to Secretary of Commerce, August 7, 1924, Bureau Records, St. Paul.
Chapter 5 - A Colonial Regime, 1918-1942
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