In 1870 potential profits from commercial sealing sparked traders' fantasies; one hundred years later the spectre of financial doom in the seal industry haunted their successors. In 1870 the federal government established Pribilof policy without seriously considering the Aleuts' interests. One hundred years later it had to negotiate policy directly with the Aleuts. Yes, Pribilof history had taken a 180-degree turn.
Cost consciousness, always a dominant factor in the Pribilof program, had in the past been cloaked by broader goals. Even as late as the 1960s, when cost containment was the motivation underlying the abandonment policy, cost issues did not achieve policy rank in their own right. But by the 1970s, on the brink of financial disaster, management adopted an explicit cost‑reduction policy.1 Abandoning the islands no longer comprised a management goal because most of the Aleuts simply refused to be resettled. Similarly, the consolidation goal, while persisting rhetorically, now represented a management hope rather than reality for the same reason. Two other elements of the abandonment policy - converting to a seasonal operation and transferring responsibility for island administration to the Aleuts - persisted as subgoals of the cost-reduction policy.
This policy reorientation reflected a growing hopelessness about the seal industry. Something was seriously wrong with the seals. The seal population reduction program instituted in the late 1950s had gone awry. The program had been shaped by predictions derived from seal survival rates of the past. But for unexplained reasons, the survival rate fell below the desired level, and nothing seemed to reverse the trend. Planned population reduction was clearly out of control. In response to this uncertainty, management consistently decreased the size of the harvests. From a peak of over 95,000 seals in 1961, the harvest shrank to only about 25,000 by 1978 - and remained relatively low throughout the 1970s. 2
Speculating about the declining survival rates, marine mammalogists considered these causes:
***The disorganized state of fur seal research.
***The reduced availability of seal food due to commercial utilization of species upon which the seals feed.
***Disruption of the nursing cycle by research activities
***Long‑term changes in the ocean environment.
***Changes in the seals'gene pool resulting from harvesting, which is an unnatural cause of mortality. 3
But no one knew for sure, and the survival rate failed to recover its former level.
With relatively fixed program costs, the reduced harvests inevitably eroded federal revenues. Every year since 1969, the Pribilof program has operated in the red. The deficit grew from almost one-half million dollars in 1970 to nearly four million in 1976.4 As a result, Congress significantly reduced the Pribilof budget, by $100,000 in 1973 and a staggering $420,000 in 1977 (representing about 14 percent of the total program budget for that year). 5
Why not pull out of the seal business entirely? Why not close down the operation? In addition to financial pressures to do so, portions of the conservation lobby called for just such an action. The Sierra Club proposed protective legislation that would prohibit all hunting of Pacific sea mammals without special permission of a Marine Mammal Commission except by aborigines who hunted for subsistence. Taking an even harder, line, the Friends of Animals and The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals agitated for an end to all killing of marine mammals, without exception. The Friends of Animals filed a suit against the Secretary of Commerce asking for an injunction to stop the seal harvests.6 The Commerce Secretary was implicated because in 1970 the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, renamed the National Marine Fisheries Service, was transferred to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Commerce Department. These environmental groups, clamoring for an end to Pribilof sealing throughout the 1970s, were joined later in the decade by the Greenpeace movement whose members threatened to sail their ship to the islands in dramatic protest against the seal slaughter.7 These groups are now pressing for a new fur seal act that would permanently end commercial sealing on the Pribilofs and terminate the United States' participation in the international fur seal treaty. The controversy they have stirred is attracting national interest. Indeed, St. Paul Island appeared to be under siege during the 1979 harvest. Listen to this account in the Tundra Times.
The annual Pribilof fur seal harvest began shortly after 5:00 a.m. Tuesday morning. Except for the presence of what appeared to be more cameras than seals on the harvesting grounds, the harvest was conducted without incident. Even a local Aleut film crew was on hand to film the large number of outside photographers, newsmen, and environmentalists there to witness the harvest ...
Leading the onslaught is a contingent from the environmentalist group, Friends of Animals. Also on hand are representatives from the Committee for Humane Legislation and the Greenpeace organization.
In addition, biologists and enforcement officers from state and federal agencies...are on hand, as well as representatives from the national press, including a CBS camera crew, and reporters from The Associated Press, National Geographic, and Life Magazine.. To top if off, three large plane loads of tourists ... have descended on the island.8
Compelling pressures, these, but the seal business was not yet finished! The United States' involvement in the International Fur Seal Treaty requires fulfilling international obligations. Furthermore, management was not at all convinced that cessation of harvests would protect the seal resource and restore former survival rates. In fact, this issue was under investigation at St. George. In 1972, the North Pacific Fur Seal convention established St. George as a seal research station and prohibited all seal killing. By this means scientists could compare the effects of harvests on one island and no harvests on the other. 9 There was an additional consideration for continuing harvests. Until the Aleuts achieved economic self-sufficiency, the government was legally responsible for their welfare. Since resettlement was no longer a realistic option and since the Aleuts remained economically dependent on the seal industry, the government hesitated to cut off this dominant source of livelihood. Nonetheless, recognizing the bleak prospect for the industry, management forged full speed ahead in promoting Aleuts' self-sufficiency.
The 1966 Fur Seal Act paved the way for this transition. It called for transferring land and property to the Aleuts as soon as they become a viable community. Viability was defined in terms of municipal incorporation under Alaska law. Actually, three types of municipal organization were available to the Aleuts. One was the traditional village council, the community club, which still operated in St. George. The second was tribal incorporation under the Indian Reorganization Act. Tribal governments lacked taxing powers but they were eligible for federal credit and loans, could operate profit-making businesses, and could sue (and be sued). St. Paul organized a tribal government in 1950 and gained considerable experience in managing local enterprises - the canteen, store, hotel, tavern, gas station, and repair shop. In addition, the tribal government assumed partial responsibility for several municipal services, including police and fire protection. It was the St. Paul tribal government that filed a suit against the federal government in 1950 charging seventy-six years of servitude. To participate in the suit, St. George joined St. Paul's tribal government in 1970. The third type of municipal organization, that intended by the Fur Seal Act, was incorporation under Alaska statutes. This form provided taxing privileges and eligibility for state revenue-sharing funds, but prohibited profit-making ventures. Encouraged by their tribal government experience and frustrated by the limitations that inhere in that form of organization, St. Paul in 1971 applied for a municipal charter and a year later became a second-class Alaska city. 10
The seven‑member city council, headed by a mayor, assumed responsibility for the municipal services formerly provided by the tribal government, plus several others -garbage collection and maintenance of roads, street lights, water system, recreation hall, and a mini-television station. The city. and tribal governments co‑existed, each with separate funding sources and functions, the one to provide services and the other to operate local businesses. The St. George people hesitated to incorporate under Alaska law; the advantage would be taxing powers, but there was nothing to tax there save store purchases, and the people opposed that idea.
While St. Paul was in the process of forming a municipality, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Aleuts deliberated the transfer of land and properties under the Fur Seal Act. But nothing concrete had been accomplished by 1971 when the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act cast a different light on land rights and conveyance.
The Native Claims Settlement Act was landmark legislation in the United States, reflecting the federal government's unique relationship to the native people and aboriginal lands in Alaska. Unlike its relationship to Indians in the continental United States, the federal government never made treaties with the Alaska natives. It simply declared most of the land in Alaska federal property. The natives' only recourse to gaining recognition of their land rights lay in filing land claims suits with the Indian Claims Commission. The Tlingit and Haida Indians of southeastern Alaska successfully pursued this course. But the Commission could compensate Indians only in money, not land; and the Alaska natives wanted land, which would require an Act of Congress..
Interest in settling the Alaska land question intensified after statehood and especially after the discovery of vast oil reserves on Alaska's north slope in 1968; for no oil could be transferred across disputed lands. With this impetus, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.
A very convoluted piece of legislation it was, but these are the central features: The Act gave the natives 40 million acres of land and nearly one billion dollars - $462.5 million from the Treasury to be distributed over an eleven-year period and $500 million from a 2 percent royalty on mineral development in the state. The act required the twelve native regional organizations in the state, each representing a geographic area roughly corresponding to cultural areas, to form profit corporations, and the villages to do likewise. The act also allowed for the organization of regional and village nonprofit associations. The regional corporations were to select 16 million acres of land; and the village corporations, the rest. The cash was to be distributed first to the regional corporations which, in turn, were to allot at least half to the village corporations and a small proportion to individual shareholders. Regional corporation income from investments was to be distributed by the same rules as the cash compensation.11
The new legislation assured the Pribilovians far more land than would have been available under the Fur Seal Act; consequently, Aleuts abandoned negotiations on that score and focused on land selections under the new law. At first, management and the Aleuts deliberated informally on land and property conveyance. Then in 1977 they formed a Joint Management Board comprised of three members each from the two village corporations - Tanaq in St. George and Tanadgusix in St. Paul - and one from the National Marine Fisheries Service. 12 Essentially, the federal government claimed only those lands and properties necessary to conduct the seal business and meet international obligations. In these retentions, management worked out joint-use agreements with the Aleuts.13 The village corporations selected nearly all the remaining land, 95 percent of the land in St. Paul and 97 percent in St. George,14 all of which selections were approved in 1976. At the same time, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Aleuts negotiated conveyance of title to the Aleuts' houses and other properties and facilities on the islands. Management agreed to bring the houses and facilities up to certain structural standards and the St. Paul airport up to Federal Aviation Agency standards before the transfer; however, budget reductions prevented fulfillment of some of these promises. The conveyance of property is not yet complete, bogged down primarily by repeated administrative delays, but settlement is expected any day. Think of that - for the first time since the purchase of Alaska, the Pribilof Aleuts are to own their land, houses, and other island properties and facilities!
The major hitch in the transition to Pribilof self-sufficiency is economic. The Aleuts' acquisition of land and property, although a milestone, failed to generate a viable economy. Aleuts presently consider unemployment and underemployment their most clamant problem. The National Marine Fisheries Service still remains the major employment source, but in 1978 it provided only thirty-six full-time permanent jobs on the two islands; nearly four times that number worked at part-time and temporary jobs, 15 and this doesn't include those who would have been in the labor force had jobs been available. Furthermore, with its eye on pulling out of the seal business, management now plans to accelerate the reduction in force. Other employment sources on the islands - the schools, village corporations, city and tribal councils hire an insignificant number of permanent workers - a total of thirty-two in 1978,16 and these sources cannot be expected to significantly increase their work force.
How that Pribilof employees occupy civil service status and hold some responsible positions, permanent workers earn a relatively adequate wage, an average of $17,403 in 1975. But the wages of temporary and part‑time workers are grossly insufficient, averaging only $4,620 in that year.17 Some of the underemployed pick up additional temporary work from other local sources and a few engage in off-island employment, but most derive the major portion of their income from National Marine Fisheries Service employment.
Clearly, the seal industry can no longer provide a stable economy in the. Pribilofs, and future prospects, especially with pressure from the conservation lobby to halt all sealing, look grim. All parties concerned with the maritime Pribilofs, including the Aleuts, are keenly aware that the fishing industry offers the only viable economic alternative. But the Pribilofs lack a boat, harbor, which the Aleuts consider necessary for the scale of operations and the shore-based fish-processing facility that they envisage. In the absence of a harbor, the only alternative for a local fishing industry would entail use of extremely large vessels, large enough to withstand the rough Bering Sea waters and anchor near St. Paul. The Pribilovians not only lack funds for such a purchase but strongly oppose the idea. Fish-processing facilities on a vessel that large would require a labor force far in excess of that locally available; it would entail use of a considerable number of imported workers.
Pribilovians agonize over the possibility of such a development. Over the past decade, they have watched the far‑reaching disruption caused by such a development in Dutch Harbor‑Unalaska, now a major fishing port, where imported workers outnumber the Aleut community by ten or twenty to one during the height of fishing season. "We don't want the Dutch Harbor syndrome here," proclaimed an Aleut leader.18 Consequently, the Pribilovians devote their energies to promoting the construction of a boat harbor which would allow smaller-scale fishery operations that the community could manage and control. Indeed, gradual, controlled fisheries development is the village corporations' development goal.
As a first step, at the Aleuts' urging, Senator Bartlett introduced a bill in 1967 to fund a feasibility study for a St. Paul boat harbor. The bill passed; the Corps of Engineers undertook the study, but funds were insufficient for its completion. And that is where matters stood for over a decade until in 1978 Congress appropriated additional funds to complete the study. This decade of delay only to accomplish a feasibility study disheartened the Aleuts. More discouraging was the Corps' cost estimate for constructing the harbor, between 15 million and 20 million dollars.19 Where would the Aleuts find such a sum?
The state is one possibility, but preliminary discussions indicate that at best the state would fund only a small part of the costs. The Aleuts' resources are far too limited to underwrite the costs. The city and corporation income is in the thousands, not the millions, and furthermore, investing in the harbor would deplete their funds, leaving nothing for fisheries and fisheries-related development. The tribal government is the most affluent local organization due to its receipt of over 8 million dollars in damages from its suit against the government. Filed in 1950, the suit wasn't settled until 1978. Finding in favor of the Aleuts, the Indian Claims Commission awarded 11.2 million dollars damages. However, at the threat of a Justice Department appeal, the Aleuts settled for 8.5 million dollars. But only about 20 percent of the settlement money is available for community development; the remainder will be distributed to individuals, primarily because a substantial portion of persons who lived on the islands during the years for which damages were paid have moved elsewhere. If most of the funds were used for local projects, these persons would be denied compensation.20 In any event, even diverting a portion of these funds to the boat harbor would leave the major costs still uncovered, which means federal government involvement is necessary.
Aleut leaders express concern that even if funding is procured, the completion of the project is still years away. They estimate that the necessary impact studies and federal legislative and appropriation process will take at least five years, and the engineers’ estimate eight years for the actual construction.21 In the meantime, corporation leaders search for interim development plans geared to their philosophy of gradual, controlled fisheries development.
Investment planning by the village corporations must take into account not only contemporary economic needs on the islands but also the profit potential. Without profits, the corporations face the danger of losing their lands when they become taxable in 1991. This apprehension creates tension in investment planning, for investments on the islands are very risky. Tanadgusix. focuses on projects both within and outside St. Paul, Locally, it operates the seal byproducts plant and an apartment complex, both of which produce profit on a small scale. But its main local investment, the tourist trade, which involves operating a hotel and restaurant, has yet to show a profit, even though the size of the tourist trade continues to grow. At the same time, the corporation is exploring the possibility of investing in a marine service base at Chernofsky on Unalaska Island, but this venture, if it proves successful, will not significantly affect the economy in St. Paul. Tanaq Corporation has even fewer options for local investment. Without a seal harvest, there is no byproducts plant. And without a tourist trade to speak of, the hotel and restaurant are not promising sources of profit. Tanaq did purchase an airplane which provides both a much‑needed 'service and profit, as the corporation leases the plane to a commercial airlines for part of the year. Tanaq also undertook an ill‑fated purchase of a 50-foot salmon fishing vessel, but it proved inadequate for the Bering Sea and is now for sale.
The regional corporation's investments affect the Pribilof economy only peripherally. The region purchased the National Marine Fisheries Service freight vessel and now handles all freight to the islands, as well as a large fishing vessel with processing capacity. Currently, it is involved in negotiations with the Economic Development Administration for loans for fisheries development. But none of these efforts produce solutions to the basic economic problem of the islands‑the seal industry no longer provides an adequate economic base, and there is no other industry there.
The economic future of the Pribilofs, indeed, is up in the air, figuratively speaking; literally, it is in the sea. And fisheries development itself may create more problems than it solves should the "Dutch Harbor syndrome" occur. Controlled fisheries development at the least will involve a boat harbor that can accommodate small‑scale fishing enterprises, and funds for the harbor are uncertain.
Meanwhile, a different kind of economic frustration plagues St. George. The moratorium on sealing deprived the Aleuts access to seal meat, important not only from economic necessity in these slack times, but as a valuable cultural symbol. The issue of St. George Aleuts' subsistence rights was not clear-cut. Eager to protect the purity of its research experiment, the National Marine Fisheries Service sought to avert the Aleuts' demand to engage in subsistence sealing on St. George. At the same time, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 197222 assured aborigines subsistence rights, providing they used aboriginal hunting methods. However, unlike the hunting of other marine mammals, seal hunting was a land‑based operation; consequently, it wasn't clear that it was protected in this legislation. To further complicate the picture, the federal government was still legally responsible for the Aleuts' welfare; most of those on St. George were poor and seal meat was their main staple. Management initially resolved these disparate considerations by delivering seal meat captured at St. Paul to St. George.
The St. George Aleuts found this scheme wholly unacceptable.
I was on the ship ...when the seal meat was loaded on board. The meat wasn't even covered and therefore exposed to air, sun, and houseflies. The rotting meat was then loaded onto the ship by the same kind of filthy nets used on shore ...placed on the deck of the ship. Dog food is given more consideration.....
The food was exposed for over eight hours before reaching its destination rotten, dried up, dirty, and fly ridden.23
The St. George people insisted on their subsistence rights. Management reluctantly submitted, providing they limit their catch to 200 animals and follow the letter of the law regarding the use of aboriginal methods, which meant canoes propelled by oars or sails and the use of hand thrown spears24 Aleuts probably never used these methods in seal hunting; if they had, their memory of it is long dead. Under these conditions the subsistence seal hunt was doomed not only to fail but to humiliate the Aleuts. Even a high‑level manager seemed embarrassed by this idle exercise.
One male seal was killed and retrieved.
Reportedly other seals were struck by spears and wounded but were not retrieved. From the description, some of these seals may have died from their wounds.
If the purpose was to demonstrate the inefficiency of such a method of food‑getting, then the point was well made. On the other hand, if this hunt was considered in any sense to have been an enactment of an ancestral technique, then it was a farce. It is improbable that aboriginal Aleuts would have used unwieldy bidars for hunting craft, or would have access to the high concentration of fearless seals as afforded by the rookery. Also it seems unlikely that they would have used spears such as those employed.25
Red-faced, management quickly abandoned this plan and again proposed delivering seals captured at St. Paul to St. George. The St. George Aleuts counter proposed sending their own men to St. Paul to kill food seals, but this proposal created another obstacle, for it involved additional expenditures. Cost conscious as never before due to severe budget reductions, the St. George manager responded to this proposal with an indirect threat that the Aleuts would have to underwrite the costs:
We do have an agreement with you and if you prefer to send your own crews over we have to support it. There's only one thing, of course, there is a little expense involved with it which means those kind of expenses gotta come from somewhere. . . and that means a little less work for some of the part‑time people here and on St. Paul. 26
Little enough work was available as it was; the Aleuts rejected any further cutbacks and reasserted their subsistence rights under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Again management acquiesced, although first it sought and won permission from the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention for land-based seal hunting at St. George. Currently, St. George Aleuts collect their seals at home, to a limit of 200 animals, and use harvesting methods to which they are accustomed. How astonished would have been the great grandparents of these contemporary Aleuts to witness their power in the negotiations with management and management's responsiveness to their demands.
We have in this period od transition to Aleut independence focused on modernization in the Pribilofs, involving such matters as city government and investment capital. What has happened to the Aleuts' culture in the process? curiously, modernization was accompanied by a cultural revitalization movement. Perhaps it's not curious at all, for with independence came the power ro shape their lives. Aleuts had never lost interest in protecting and promoting their culture; they were simply helpless in the fqce of cultural suppressions imposed by the federal government. The St. George Aleuts' insistence on subsistence sealing is one manifestation of their determination to perpetuate their culture. Sealing represents more than a means of securing food; it is a way of life and a source of raw materials for the production of clothes and artifacts. And there were other manifestations. One was the Aleuts' interest in reconstructing their history. Tanadgusix published a history entitled, Slaves of the Harvest.27 Several Aleuts are themselves collecting historical data. For example, a St. Paul man recently visited Funter Bay to gather data on the evacuation; another is preparing classroom materials from historical records on the island. After years of suppression of their language, they now seek to reinvigorate it through bilingual programs in the schools and parents' efforts in the home. And they remain devotedly committed to the Russian Orthodox Church, which they view as a powerful cultural symbol. These, then, are the visible ingredients of contemporary Pribilof culture-history, hunting, food, religion, language, and artifacts.
Indeed, this is the way St. Paul school children perceive their culture, revealed in themes the teacher assigned to seventh and eighth graders in 1972 entitled, "What is an Aleut?" Here are two examples.
He (an Aleut) is like a person and is a Native of the Alaska chain. We have traditions‑the ladies go to the recreation hall and have arts and crafts. They make fur hats, parkas, shoes, and mittens, and the same costumes. We go to church, church school, and learn about the church.... We have our own community, and our family life is pretty good too. And we're hunters. We go out and hunt sea lions, birds, when the hunting season opens up and in the summer (we) go out sealing and get food for our family and get the skins baked and throw them in big tanks to be salted and then we blubber and pack them and send them out. In the summer we go on vacations. We go to St. George and visit for about a week or until the boat comes back.
I am Aleut. We are out in the middle of the Bering Sea and we love it. We love the cool winds and the warm sun. Sometimes we go reindeer, seal lion, fox trapping, and duck hunting. Sometimes we go swimming when the water gets warm. One time it was so hot that you could take off your jacket. Even in the winter it gets warm but we never take off our jackets because it would be kind of chilly.
Yes, these Aleut students appear to value their environment and way of life. We found the same attitude among the adults. And this explains why they have maintained many elements of their culture despite decades of suppression by the federal government and why they have refused to move from the islands despite a bleak economic outlook and powerful pressures. to do so by the government.
I found the Pribilof Aleuts quite prideful and self-respecting. Standing erect, shoulders square, they speak with dignity and respect about their lives and struggles and those of their fellows. This degree of dignity, pride, and self‑respect probably stems from the Pribilof Aleuts' tendency not to blame themselves for their misery. Rather, they direct the finger of blame at an external source, the United States Government. In other native communities in Alaska and elsewhere, the process of deculturation and oppression has been far more insidious, the forces responsible for deprivation are more difficult to identify. And as a result, many of these other native groups tend to assail themselves for their condition, becoming demoralized in the process. This is not to suggest that the direct, readily identifiable form of oppression in the Pribilofs is good for people; it always takes a heavy toll. But it is to underscore the importance that oppressed people anywhere resist the tendency to join their oppressors in blaming themselves.
2. Don C. Foote, Victor Fischer, and George Rogers, St. Paul Community Study: An Economic and Social Analysis of St. Paul, Pribilof Islands, Alaska (Fairbanks: University of Alaska, Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research, 1968), p. 22; "Pribilof Islands Report: Meeting with the State of Alaska," June 4, 1975, p. 10, National Marine Fisheries Service Records, Seattle; Annual Report of the Pribilof Islands Management Program, Pribilof Islands, Alaska, 1975, p. 1, 1976, p. 1, National Marine Fisheries Service Records, Seattle; Walter Kirkness, Program Director, Pribilof Islands Program, to Dorothy Jones, July 31, 1979.
3. Federal Register, 38, no. 47, August 1, 1973, p. 20599.
4. "Pribilof Islands Report: Meeting with the State of Alaska," June 4, 1975, p. 10, National Marine Fisheries Service Records, Seattle; Walter Kirkness to Dorothy Jones, July 31, 1979.
5. Director, National Marine Fisheries Service, to Assistant Administrator for Marine Resources, March 1, 1973; "NMFS Task Development Plan: Pribilof Islands Operations‑Administration of St. Paul," October 19, 1977, p. 4, National Marine Fisheries Service Records, Seattle.
6. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Committee on Commerce; Ocean Mammal Protection, 2 parts, 92nd Congress, 2nd sess., 1973, Part 1, p. 750. 7. The Seattle Times, Sunday, June 17, 1979, p. D‑4. 8. Tundra Times, June 27, 1979, p. 1.
9. "Press Release," Office of Secretary of Commerce, March 28, 1973, National Marine Fisheries Service Records, Seattle.
10. St.Paul incorporated as a fourth-class city in 1971. A year later the State Legislature eliminated that class, and all fourth‑class cities automatically became second‑class.
11. For an excellent discussion of the features of the act, see Gerald A. McBeath and Thomas A. Morehouse, Alaska Native Self-Government Anchorage: University of Alaska, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1978), pp. 86-109. Also to be published as The Dynamics of Alaska Native Self-Government (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1980).
12. The joint Management Board's first formalized agreements were the following:
a. Joint use by the Parties of roads, docks, scoria pits, sanitary land fills and other areas on the islands appropriate to joint management.
b. Recreational, subsistence, official, and other uses, by the Parties of land on the Islands not owned by the
Party desiring the use thereof.
c. Provision for tourists, research personnel, official guests, and other visitors to the Islands.
d. Protection of the fur seal herds and the fur seal research program from undue interference.
e. Such other items of mutual concern to the Parties as may properly come before the board.
"Cooperative Agreement between the Native People of St. Paul Island and St. George Island, Alaska and United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, to Establish the Pribilof Islands Joint Management Board," December 22, 1976, National Marine Fisheries Service Records, Seattle.
13. "Meeting with Tanadgusix Corporation, Tanaq Corporation, the Aleut Corporation and Aleutian Planning Commission regarding the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act," February 21, 22, 1974, National Marine Fisheries Service Records, Seattle.
14. The village corporations also selected lands on the Aleutian Islands of Umnak and Unalaska.
15. "Permanent Employees, St. Paul Island, Alaska, 1978"; "Temporary Employees, St. Paul Island, Alaska, 1978"; "Permanent Employees, St. George Island, Alaska, 1978"; "Temporary Employees, St. George Island, Alaska, 1978." Tanadgusix Corporation Files, St. Paul; Tanaq Corporation Files, St. George.
16. Ibid.: Field Notes.
17. "Pribilof Islands Report: Meeting with the State of Alaska," June 4, 1975, p. 16, National Marine Fisheries Service Records, Seattle.
18. Larry Merculieff, Tanadgusix Corporation, personal communication, July 27, 1979.
20. Ibid., Agafon Krukoff, Aleut Corporation, Personal Communication, July 26, 1979; Mike Lekanoff, Aleutian-Pribilof Islands Association, Personal Communication, July 15, 1979, August 6, 1980.
21. Larry Merculieff, Personal Communication, July 27, 1979.
22. 86 Stat. 1027. Public Law 92-522 (October 21, 1972).
23. Tundra Times, August 8, 1973, p. 1.
24. "For the Record," Resource Management Specialist, October 2, 1975, National Marine Fisheries Service Records, Seattle.
26. "Meeting of NMFS Program Director and St. George Community about Subsistence Sealing" (transcript of tape recording of meeting), June 8, 1978.
27. Barbara Boyle Torrey, Slaves of the Harvest: The Story of the Pribilof Aleuts (St. Paul Island: Tanadgusix Corporation, 1978).
Chapter 10: In Sum: What Happpened on the Pribilofs?
Table of Contents